For a three-dimensional semiotic model

 of the philosophical speech

                                                                                            

 

 

Viorel Guliciuc

 

                                              

 

 

1.       As the Danish Ivan Almeida[i] was able to demonstrate during his research, pertinently, starting from the main styles of the reason (with the exception of induction, irretrievable from semiotical point of view) and from Charles Peirce’s possible readings of semiose, there are two main sides of semiose: the structural order semiose (also called “deductive”) and the one of aesthetic cognitive order (“abductive”). Beyond the reach literature dedicated to the theme of its specific and limits (of Eco, Todorov or Almeida), one can accept, as well as Almeida did it, that “it would be dangerous to give an a priori definition of semiotics, because all definition would necessary exclude an area of practice already established. It would be the best to apply for the fact that semiotics can be considered everything that semioticiens make when they presented to make semiotics” [1:4]. Let us concede, however, that semiotics can be considered as the survey of the virtual reality of the alternative universes of semiose.[ii]

“For a long time, semiotics and philosophy have been considered like two opposite intellectual opinions, may be articulable, but difficult to be reconcilable”, [1a:1]. Therefore, an exigent survey on their reports (as they have been conceived nearly until our days), would be able to put in evidence the LANDED precariousness of our conceptual distinctions before the non-generic universality of the fact of being. “In fact, considers Almeida, the conflict seems to be located implicitly between two extrapolations: semiotics was reduced to the exercise of the structural analysis, while of philosophy one kept the current hermeneutics only” [1a:1]. The destructive reciprocal perception, where the reductionist opposition is placed (because philosophy is not only “spirit of sharpness” and interpretation, and semiotics is not only “geometric spirit” and structural analysis, either), is not, nevertheless, so easy to hunt out of our theoretical prejudgments.

Grosso modo, the “classic” conflict between structural semiotics (“deductive”) and hermeneutics – (recte: between semiotics and philosophy) – could be synthesized (thinks Almeida) in the following manner:

(1)    “The orientation of semiotics is formalizing, while hermeneutics gives emphasis to the ‘thematic’ aspect of the contents.

(2)    What hermeneutics tries to outline as ‘individuality’, semiotics calls an actualization of a ‘system’ of which it describes the grammar. One can specify it while saying that semiotics aims ‘the sense’ as the effect of carving inside of an enclosed system, while hermeneutics aims ‘the significance’, reported to a ‘having lived thing’, in an open organization.

(3)    * Semiotics constructs its topic as an internal configuration, while hermeneutics asks for the appropriation of a ‘text’ by an exterior topic, be it individual or transcendental.

(4)    * Semiotics sees itself as an objective science, while hermeneutics is a philosophy with presuppositions, that cannot elude the pre-comprehension part of the topic in the establishment of the significant world intended by the text.

(5)    According to (3)* and (4)*, one can say that the movement of semiotics is the following one: a) text → b) system → c) direction while the quasi-dialectic movement of hermeneutics would be: x) pre-comprehension of the topic → y) alienation of the topic in the text → z) appropriation of the world of significance of the text by the topic.

(6)    Hence, the conflict of reciprocal inclusion. Hermeneutics considers that the intermediate stage of its process (y), would correspond to a technical work of legitimate semiotics (a, b, c), but named to be preceded and out of date by extrinsic steps (x and z). On the other hand, semiotics will say that the results of hermeneutics (x, y, z) are to be reconsidered in all respects, like a non-privilegeable text (a), in which semiotics can insert the working-system (b) and the direction (c)” [1a:1-2].[iii]

Today we have surmounted by and large this “quarrel of the universals”. The dispute between structural semiotics and hermeneutics is provoked at the moment when they do not have a common point anymore with regarded to the interpretation of one of their fundamental presuppositions – that of the sign as ‘surrogate’ (“reflection” therefore) – of a classic traditional order. “Behind the polemic’s appearances hermeneutics and structural semiotics answer to the same epistemological option, that is neither the only one, nor, necessarily the most indicated one, in order to be responsible for the phenomenon of the significance. This option places the significance under the sign of the equivalence or substitution (a = b): behind a sign or a configuration (a: speech) there is a content (b: semantic structures, world), necessarily situated on another level of knowledge” [1a:2], says the same author.

 

Accepting the idea that semiotics is invested by philosophy, and that a semiotic movement gets settled sine qua non, to the very heart of the strictest philosophical survey, one could not miss the dialogue between the structural view and the cognitive-aesthetic one, without being condemned to the excess and vain radicalness.

 

2.       The interest for the semiotic survey of the philosophical persists to be precarious. The proof is not only the restricted enough number of works strictly dedicated to this problematic but also the presence of one capital - enough limited – of theoretical perspectives implied in the undertaken studies.

To a partial, non-systematic analysis of the so far obtained results, in the explicit, systematic research of the philosophical, of the perspective of the ‘being-told’– that is understood in the most widened sense – one can easily observe that such disciplines as semiotics or meta-logic, hermeneutics or rhetoric, linguistics or semiology, meta-philosophy or pragmatics, logic, the language philosophy or epistemology, can not cover, however, all the possibilities to approach the discourse / the discursiveness / the philosophical language; of the perspective of the ‘being-told’, that could always include: semantics, the theory of the text, the theory of reading, the narrative grammar, stylistic, etc.

On the other hand, the systematic semiotic research of the speech / philosophical language – inaugurated by M. Guéroult Urbino, (in 1953!) – develops only after 1986 – when in Urbino, Ivan Almeida published his first work concerning the reports between semiotics and philosophy, between semiotics and hermeneutics, entitled “Semiotics and interpretation”.

Then, the theme becomes well-known in 1996, when a symposium is dedicated to it, at the International Center of Semiotics and Linguistics, by the famous university (Urbino). Prestigious scientists in the domain of semiotics presented a series of studies concerning the philosophical speech; among them: Frédéric Nef – “The representational and narrative dimension of the philosophical speech and his ‘engeu augmentatif’, Augusto Ponzio – “Il carattere dialogico del discorso filosofico”; Filippo Costa – Agrammaticalita interdisciplinare: poesia e filosofia”; Ivan Almeida – “And yet, and yet…”. Philosophy without enunciation? (Borges et Wittgenstein); Per Aage Brandt – “Une page de philosophie analytique”; José – Maria Nadal – “Les limites du discours philosophique”, etc.

 

3.       Therefore, one can try a “strong disjunctive” semiotic research of the horizons and the levels of the philosophical speech in two “opposite” manners: either of the structural semiotics perspective (deductive), either of the cognitiv-aesthetic semiotics one (abductive).

In this generous space of the semiosis virtual reality, the different options of the two semiotics do not mean, therefore, reciprocal exclusion, but complementarity.[iv] The exclusive choice of one type of semiotics or another is not even totally possible, because of the extreme difficulty to maintain in the theoretical space circumscribed to a radical alternative. “Anyway”, writes Almeida, “the structural semiotics has never existed in a pure state, and if one corrects the reference – moreover metaphorical than real – to the generative and perensemble diagrams, the practice of the greimasienne analysis – based on the notions of narrative and representational course – adapts itself, quite well, to the presuppositions of semiotics (of a peircean tendency). It would be better, then, to talk about the difference between two idealities: a) the “linguistic” semiotics, that would take as starting point the general notion and the assimilation of all sign to the linguistic sign, and b) the “cognitive” or “aesthetic” semiotics, that would take as starting point the individual face, as place of knowledge” [1a:6].

This “broken” nature of semiotics (similar, maybe, to the one about which Nichita Stanescu spoke in his “Antimetaphysics”, relatively to the specificity of “philosophy”) is not without any consequences for a semiotic research of the philosophical. The philosophical speech, for instance, as coherent whole of philosophical texts of a philosopher or of a philosophical school, could be studied either by emphasizing the limits (the closings), or by accentuating the limitations (the openings).

Theoretically, one could choose, therefore, between a closed system finite semiotics (structural / deductive) and an infinite course semiotics (cognitive / aesthetic) [1a:7].

Reported to the semiotic object “text”, the difference takes the following shape: “a semiotics of the finite text takes a starting point a notion related to what linguistics calls ‘language’. As language, the space studied by this aesthetics is always conceived like an enclosed system, following the logico-mathematical theory of the wholes. A semiotics of the infinite text looks for the significances inside of something as a ‘language’ – that is a device – always open – of symbolism. An infinite device does not necessarily make systems, but it has some courses. Therefore, instead of a superposition of wholes or hierarchized languages, it will propose some modules in a deshierarchized interface, in the manner of those Societies of Mind” (of which speaks Mr. Minsky) [1a:7].

In principle, as a system with limits and precise openings, the philosophical can be explored semiotically, as interface between a sémiose of the finite systems and one of the infinite systems, as Janos Bifrons, as a finite – infinite dialogue – what could be tempting, as the philosophical categories are real “margins of the thought”, and the last consequences of a philosophy explore the virtual reality zones, of rationality not even properly constituted.

Starting up from a new reading of Pierce, the already mentioned Danish scientist outlines the heuristic course specific to philosophy in the following manner: “To be in condition to assign a conjectural normalization to a surprising fact, it is necessary ‘to identify’, beforehand, the originality of such fact. For structural semiotics, a fact is, semantically speaking, but a ‘value’ in a system. One may practise or conceal the economy interpretation of the individual phenomenon.

The essence of the abductive semiotics is above all this one: a fact can be explained but once it has been conferred a certain interpretation. In other words, structural semiotics starts with the ‘a priori’ establishment of certain ‘pertinent features’ (because they are derivatives of the theory). Abductive semiotics starts with an operation that precedes any notion of relevance. The units do not only define themselves by carving, because to be able to justify this carving, it is necessary to observe the immanent features of the individual object, and to decide, then the convenient structure we refer to” [1a:19]. We must not forget that, from a structural perspective, even the existence of a philosophical speech is a fact that wants to be interpreted, because its apparition in literature changes the force reports between ideas and the situation of the philosophical research at one time.

In the case of an abductive approach, “one has to start by assuming the text as an ‘extraordinary’ fact, because otherwise, it wouldn’t need to be explained. In other words, the fact that something is either said or written, changes the neighborhood of the silence, and dons the advantages of a catastrophy, in the topological sense of the term, automatically. Any thing that one tells must be worthwhile to be told, hence, one ‘implicits’ that it is not about a ‘triviality’. Without this prejudice, there is not a possible abduction” [1a:36].

 

4.       In spite of the appearances, the heuristic resources of the classic sémiose, of deductive structural order are not exhausted. The fact is not proved only by the multitude of studies dedicated to the dimensions of sémiose, but also by the possibility to systematize them by the use of the generous setting of the generalized hexadic model of sémioze – the one of the semiotic hypercube.

The tripartition of the sémiotic universe – as well as it is sketched in the works of Pierce, Frege, Morris, Carnap, E.S. Johnson, Ogden and Richards, or St. Ullmann – is one of the strongest thesis of semiotics, but also one of the most imperious to the change. Accepting this reality, it is proper nevertheless to be conscious because, at the same time with the last works of Morris, with George Klaus’s semiotic conception, with “the semiotic quadrilateral of A.J. Ayer”, with the “saussurean model of the significance”, with “Gardiner’s semiotic quadrilateral”, with “Peirce’s tetraedric model”, or with “Morris’s model – of 1946 – of sémiose”[v] the ‘classic’ triadic models of sémiose make place to the tetradic models and, then, to the pentadic, hexadic or even heptadic ones. On the other hand, one must underline that the attacks to the address of the classic tripartition of the semiotic process – materialized or not in the proposition of new models of the semiotic situation – were important and in a big enough number. At present, taking into account Petru Ioan’s[vi] proposition of the hexadic model, we went through one stage more in the erosion process of this real ‘principium semioticum’.[vii] In this respect let us observe that the reactions of different semioticians towards the hexadic model answer the consciousness of the fact that the hexadic structures remain indispensable to all structural semiotics research.

On the other hand, the generous idea of a scale of the semiotic objects complexity comes to support the newest tendencies of the structural semiotic research.[viii] To really exemplify this we must remind that, in this direction, the structural-deductive semiotic setting seems to be permissive to the idea of a hexadic modelation (extremely generous in possibilities, as well as the researcher Petru Ioan from Iasi demonstrates it, as its creator). Following him from beginning to end, we could get interesting reconsiderations of the conceptual space of the philosophical – but also of the ‘being-told’ – able to stir the attention of other domains of the philosophical reflection, that those directly bound to this problematic; it is admirable and unexpected the structural wealth of the philosophical speech can be generated, provoked by a re-valued hexadic-setting; and this is an admirable, unexpecting thing.

 

5.       A first deductive-hexadic model of the semiotic space of the philosophical speech is obtained taking into account, besides the emitter and respectively, the receptor of the philosophical thought, the dimensions, the horizons, the levels and the domains of the philosophical:

 

                       emitter

 

 

        domain                                            level

 

 

        horizon                                        dimension

 

                             

                                 receptor

 

                                The semiotic hexade,

conceptual and deductive-structural, of the philosophical

 

Such an analytic instrument could be used to discriminate between different manners to approach the history of philosophy, according to the preponderant stress laid on one or other pole of this hexad. According to the reading sense of this complex graph, we could get as many types of perspectives on the historic evolution of philosophy. Besides, this graph could varied by the discrimination of several types of emitters, receptors, domains, dimensions, horizons or levels of the philosophical (of the philosophical speech); this could facilitate greater chances to detect some philosophical forms, specific to certain categories of the speech: essay, logic, system, etc.

 

One could say, on the other hand, that, in presence of the complexity and the wealth of the structural-deductive sémiose of the philosophical, the hexadic model itself could be improved… In this respect, it can be placed in a three-dimensional setting, so that the six poles of the hexad become the facets of a cube. Without any possibility of big mistake, one can say that this model may be considered the ideal model of any philosophical speech (and it can be of all speech, insofar as one concedes on its relevance as semiotic, generic setting). If one operated some combinations (readings) of the six poles (sides) of the semiotic cube – as well as it is permitted in the Rubik’s cube – one could get, quickly enough, the shapes of different types of speech. The variations from this “canonical” shape could be generated in a manner abalogue to the famous cube. Therefore, it would be obvious why there are no rules of generation of a specific type of philosophical speech, while learning from the general semiotic model (or less than a model), but only forbidden rules of transformation. The free shapes obtained after the respective “rotations”, which, here could be associated to some semiotic meta-operators – therefore the multifaced cubes – could always be associated to some particular types of the philosophic speech / philosophical language / philosophical discursiveness.

 

 

Notes:

 

 


 

[i] a. Ivan Almeida: The abductive interpretation and the controlling of the reasonable. Semiotics and philosophy; in Documents of Work and pre-publications, (Fr.), no. 197, 198, 199/1990, series A. Centro Internazionale di Semiotica e di Linguistica, Urbino, 1990. To see also:

   b. Ivan Almeida: Semiotics and interpretation (Peirce – Greimas – Ricoeur); in Documents of Work and pre-publications, (Fr.), no. 153, 154/1986, series A. Centro Internazionale di Semiotica e di Linguistica, Urbino, 1986.

 

[ii] Regarding the reports of semiotics with logic, linguistics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, ethnology or aesthetics; to see Traian-Dinorel Stanciulescu, “The Myths of Creation. Semiotic readings” (Rom.), Ed. Performantica, Iasi, 1995, pp. 19-23.

 

[iii] A confrontation of hermeneutics and structuralism can be found in Paul Ricoeur’s work, who assumes it explicitly in the survey “Structures and hermeneutics” (1963), in the volume: Paul Ricoeur, Lectures 2. The region of philosophies, Édition du Seuil, Paris, 1991: 351 sqq.) (Fr.), with reference to Claude Lévi-Strauss’s conception.

 

[iv] And perhaps it is time to question us whether that famous principle of complementarity in the atomic physics, couldn’t be extended in the alternative, real-virtual universe of sémiose.

 

[v] Petru Ioan, “Educatie si creatie in perspectiva unei logici situationale”, (Education and creation from the perspective of a ‘situational’ logic), Ed. Didactica si Pedagogica, Bucuresti,, 1995, pp. 72-144.

 

[vi] Owed to the well-known researcher Petru Ioan, from Iasi. See, especially [5], loc. Cit. It is interesting to notice that Gary Shank and Don Cunningham could detect, in 1996 six modes of Pierce’s abduction, what comes in the help of the hexadic model of the above mentioned researcher. The survey of the two researches entitled: “Modeling the Six Modes of Peircean Abduction for Educational Purposes” can be consulted at URL: http://www.cs.indiana/edu/event/maics96/Proceedings/shank.html

 

[vii] The first explicit presentation of the hexadimensional conception on semiose has been made in 1992, when Petru Ioan published “Reperele ‘situatiei semiotice’ prin analogie cu ‘situatia pedagogica’,” (Marks of reference of the ‘semiotic situation’ by analogy with the ‘pedagogic situation’”) in “The Annals of the “Al. I. Cuza” University, Iasi, no. 1-2/1992, pp. 93-97.

 

[viii] Thus, to a simple research of the themes submitted to proceedings, on the Internet, one can note the diversity and the wealth of the topics, but also an implicit scale of the semiotic interest. In this respect one can start from the already mentioned Martin Ryder’s list.